Founder Research
Examines leadership effectiveness, ownership dynamics, and succession outcomes using data from both founder-led and professionally managed companies.
Examines leadership effectiveness, ownership dynamics, and succession outcomes using data from both founder-led and professionally managed companies.
data points
founders and non-founder CEOs
of founders leave their position before the end of the hold period
Founder-led companies represent a growing share of private equity transactions. PE deals involving founder-led companies jumped from 54% of transactions in 2020 to 62% in 2023, and the dollar value of founder-involved deals rose from 31% to 44% over the same period (PitchBook). For investors, that means working more often with companies in which the founder remains central to strategy, culture, customers, and decision-making.
Founders do not lead like other chief executives. The characteristics of many founder leaders – self-reliance, creativity, and deep emotional investment in the enterprise – sets them apart from traditional CEOs, whose acquired expertise and pattern-recognition skills are better suited to incremental growth inside an existing structure. Professional CEOs often bring experience scaling and optimizing an existing organization; founders bring the perspective of having created the company and shaped its early operating model.
ghSMART’s Founder Research examines a central tension: the traits that let a founder build something from nothing – vision, relentlessness, deep ownership – are often the same traits that create friction once the company scales, takes on investors, and eventually requires succession. The same characteristics can create value in one phase of growth and become constraints in another.
The research draws on more than 1,400 data points from deep assessments of 50 founder CEOs and 58 non-founder CEOs in PE-backed companies, along with dozens of qualitative interviews. The findings have been published across three Harvard Business Review articles from 2024 to 2026 by a ghSMART research team including Samantha Hellauer, Sanja Kos, Julie Vermoote, BJ Wright, and, on the founder succession research, Sapna Sadarangani Werner.
The performance implications can be significant. A Bain study cited in ghSMART’s founder-investor research found that companies with deeply involved founders performed three times better than non-founder-led companies over a 15-year period. Realizing that potential depends in part on how founder strengths are supported, how leadership gaps are addressed, and how effectively founders, investors, and successors work together.
The foundational study analyzed more than 1,400 data points from deep assessments of 50 successful founder CEOs and 58 non-founder CEOs, all leading private equity-backed companies. The quantitative layer draws on ghSMART’s proprietary database of more than 27,000 assessed C-suite executives, including over 2,000 CEOs; the qualitative layer comes from interviews with founders, investors, CEO successors, and portfolio talent leaders who have lived through the transitions the data describes.
The comparison group is important because These non-founder CEOs are not generic corporate executives; they are professional CEOs running PE-backed companies under the same ownership pressures and value-creation expectations. Comparing leaders operating in similar PE-backed environments helps isolate differences associated with founder status, although the study is observational and does not by itself establish causation.
A central finding is that founder CEOs are “spikier” than their professional counterparts: their strengths and development areas tend to be more pronounced. In this research, spikiness describes a leadership profile with distinctive strengths alongside equally meaningful gaps. It provides a useful lens for assessing, supporting, and succeeding a founder.
ghSMART Founder Research has been published as a connected series in Harvard Business Review, each article answering a distinct question from the same dataset and research team.
“The Strengths and Weaknesses That Set Founders Apart” (HBR, October 2024) asks what makes founders distinctively different from professional CEOs. It established the founder DNA framework, the spikier finding, and the five superpowers and five blind spots below.
“How to Unlock Value in Founder-Investor Partnerships” (HBR, May-June 2025) asks how founders and PE investors should navigate the friction points that reliably surface between them, with guidance written for both sides of the table.
“Leading After the Founder” (HBR, January-February 2026) asks how companies, successors, boards, and investors should navigate the founder-to-CEO handoff – the highest-risk transition in the research.
Together, the three articles examine how founders lead, how they work with investors, and how organizations navigate founder succession. The work also connects to the same behavioral methodology underpins ghSMART’s CEO Genome® research (/ceo-genome-research) and the structured interviewing discipline of the Who Method and SmartAssessment®, while the view of trajectory is informed by the Potential Model. The founder dataset is a deliberate subset, designed to isolate what is distinctive about people who build companies rather than inherit them.
No two founders are the same, but five strengths appear at rates that consistently distinguish founder CEOs from non-founder CEOs running comparable companies. These are the capabilities worth backing – and the ones most at risk of being smoothed away by well-intentioned professionalization.
Creative, innovative thinking registered as a core strength for 36% of founder CEOs, the most distinctive founder capability in the dataset. Founders often originate new ideas and pursue opportunities before the market has fully validated them. By contrast, 25% of non-founder CEOs faced challenges originating new ideas, relying instead on execution and past experience – a different profile from the founder group.
An ability to inspire through passion, charisma, and loyalty appeared in 86% of founders, the highest-frequency strength in the research. Founders coalesce diverse groups around a shared goal, and founders can have an unusually strong influence on company culture because they helped create its values, norms, and early ways of working. More than two-thirds of non-founder CEOs, by comparison, struggled to gain broad followership, frequently by overextending teams or pushing too hard too fast.
75% of founder CEOs demonstrated a strong aptitude for understanding customers and building products around them, rooted in deep domain and industry knowledge. This depth can give founders strong pattern recognition around customers, products, and their market. Non-founder CEOs bring a different asset – 90% relied on a generalist general management playbook, and deep specialization was a gap for more than a third of them.
Exceptional drive and resilience appeared in 76% of founder CEOs, and what the assessments capture is not simply long hours. Founders’ ownership and personal investment in the company can sustain effort through prolonged adversity. Non-founder CEOs are not short of drive – a hard-charging desire to deliver showed up in 60% of that group – but it grows out of credibility demonstrated through action-oriented execution. The research suggests that drive can manifest differently in founders and professional CEOs.
More than half of founder CEOs demonstrated an exceptional ability to pivot companies and products as context shifted, adapting continuously through problem-solving and invention. This adaptability can be particularly valuable in early growth stages, when strategy and operating plans change frequently. Among non-founder CEOs, 47% over-relied on past playbooks when facing ambiguity.
The research also identified recurring development areas that can become more consequential as when professional investors arrive and the company scales. These are not character flaws – framing them that way leads to bad interventions. They are structural tendencies rooted in what building a company from scratch demands.
58% of founders found it challenging to release control, and For some founders, delegating decisions can be difficult because the company is closely tied to their identity and sense of ownership. It shows up as volatility under pressure and as tension with investors and board members who expect a more measured, distributed approach.
76% of otherwise successful founder CEOs underinvested in operational governance – the most common blind spot in the research. Founders prefer to chase new ideas rather than optimize existing ones, and the informal approaches that work early can become less effective as scale requires greater repeatability. By comparison, 60% of non-founder CEOs excel at operational excellence and metrics-driven cultures, highlighting the different strengths professional CEOs may bring to a scaling organization.
54% of founders delayed upgrading talent and removing underperformers. Early employees are rarely just employees; they are people who believed in the founder before the outcome was certain. The emotional cost of replacing them is real and not irrational. The organizational cost is equally real: loyalty to early hires who cannot operate at the company’s new scale becomes a ceiling on growth – one the founder installed personally, which makes it uniquely difficult for anyone else to raise.
More than half of the founders analyzed were weaker at engaging investors and boards consistently. Two failure modes recur. The first is sharing recent news without connecting it to long-term strategy, leaving a board unable to separate signal from noise. The second is the inverse: long-term vision without tactical progress, leaving investors unable to verify execution. Both can weaken board and investor confidence and can often be addressed through more structured communication.
42% of founders displayed an overly optimistic outlook that underestimated risk on the basis of prior success. Past success can reinforce confidence in ways that make future risks easier to underestimate. Among non-founder CEOs, 62% brought a more pragmatic, risk-conscious approach – a potentially useful counterbalance within the leadership team or board.
The research identified three recurring areas of friction in founder-PE partnerships: cultural tension, control-related dynamics, and long-term alignment.
Cultural tension. Founders view their companies as extensions of identity and legacy, so changes an investor makes to improve scalability can be experienced as a threat to the culture and identity that helped create the company’s value. These dynamics can also affect deal selection and the founder’s choice of investment partner. Investors who fail to understand the founder’s trusted inner circle, values, and non-negotiables lose deals to lower bidders who showed cultural empathy.
Control-related dynamics. Ceding control and decision-making to others is a developmental area for 58% of founders – Governance structures investors see as essential for accountability can feel to a founder like constraints on the creativity and customer focus that drove the results being underwritten. The research recommends designing governance with the founder rather than relying solely on a standard template.
Long-term alignment. Founders and investors frequently enter partnerships holding different assumptions about exit timing, what value creation means, and how the founder’s role should evolve. Those assumptions are rarely tested at signing. They should be: 46% of founders exit the CEO position before the end of the PE holding period. Discussing that possibility early can clarify expectations about the founder’s role and the investment horizon.
For founders, four practices consistently improve the partnership. Showcase company culture during due diligence, not just financials. Identify nonnegotiables early and state them plainly. Reframe team upgrades as amplifying the original vision rather than betraying the people who built it. And hold regular pulse-check conversations in which the bumps are shared alongside the wins, because trust is built by early disclosure rather than clean quarters.
For investors, the mirror set applies. Build genuine personal rapport before the deal and sustain it throughout. Learn what makes this founder exceptional and channel those strengths rather than smoothing them into a standard executive profile; the founder’s distinctive strengths may be an important part of the investment thesis. Co-design governance frameworks instead of importing best-practice templates, and revisit the value-creation plan as conditions change, treating it as a working agreement rather than a fixed contract.
Founder-CEO handovers carry a risk of failure or performance downturn two to three times greater than transitions involving non-founder CEOs. This elevated risk makes founder succession an important issue for founders, boards, investors, and incoming CEOs.
Founder transitions involve emotional and relational dynamics as well as organizational ones. The founder is emotionally intertwined with the company’s identity, is trusted by employees in a way no successor inherits automatically, and is frequently the last person in the building to recognize that a style or capability set which worked brilliantly may no longer fit what comes next. Timing is the largest controllable variable: transitions are most effective when initiated from a position of strength, while the founder still has the energy to champion a successor with conviction. Transitions initiated only after performance or relationships deteriorate can be harder to manage.
The first question is whether a leadership transition is needed at all. Some founders remain well positioned to lead for the long term. The signals that a transition may be warranted are behavioral rather than financial, and they appear before the numbers move: declining drive to innovate, falling back on solutions that worked in an earlier era, mounting frustration with the team, and fading excitement about the role. Where those signals are absent, staying on – recommitted with purpose, adaptability, and intention – is often the right call, and it should be an explicit decision rather than a default.
The founder’s role after the transition can materially affect the incoming CEO’s ability to lead. The research identifies four archetypes, each with a distinct benefit and failure mode.
Founder to chairperson. Offers continuity and prestige, letting the founder command respect internally and retain external influence. It works best when the founder genuinely wants to serve as strategic guidepost and external advocate. Without a well-defined scorecard the role devolves into a symbolic title – visible enough to confuse the organization about who decides, empty enough to frustrate the founder. Bill Gates at Microsoft is the reference case.
Founder to strategic adviser or non-executive director. Preserves institutional knowledge and cultural continuity without operational involvement. It depends on deliberate boundary-setting and on the founder explicitly endorsing the successor’s authority in front of the organization. Stewart Butterfield’s role at Slack following the Salesforce acquisition illustrates the pattern.
Founder to functional role. Keeps the founder close to the domain she loves – product, science, commercial strategy – while creating operational space for the CEO. It requires careful management of reporting dynamics and trust, since the founder is now formally subordinate inside a company they created. Larry Ellison at Oracle is the best-known example.
Founder exit. The clearest governance option, giving the incoming CEO full authority. It can also create a cultural and strategic vacuum if not planned carefully; where feasible, an overlap between outgoing and incoming leaders improves the outcome.
The research identifies six qualities that can help successors navigate a founder transition. Low ego with high confidence: quiet self-assurance, without a need to prove themselves quickly. Cultural empathy: rituals, unwritten rules, and shared mythology carry real weight in a founder-built company. Stakeholder savviness: navigating founder, board, and team at once. Complementary strengths: filling the gaps this growth phase demands rather than replicating the founder. Respectful change leadership: discerning what to preserve from what to evolve. Emotional resilience: isolation in an early tenure is common and should be anticipated.
Understanding your own founder DNA – the strengths and development areas that may shape how you lead – is the prerequisite for navigating the investor relationship, scaling beyond your comfort zone, and designing a transition that preserves your legacy. ghSMART’s founder-focused advisory work founderEDGE applies this research to individual founders.
Assessing a founder-led company requires a different lens than assessing a professionally managed one. Assessing founder leadership requires attention to both distinctive strengths and potential gaps in governance, delegation, talent, and stakeholder management.
Succeeding a founder is unlike any other CEO transition, and standard CEO succession practices may need to be adapted. Cultural, relational, and governance dynamics are particularly important early in the transition.
Succession belongs on the board agenda from day one, not when a founder signals burnout or a crisis forces the conversation. Given a failure rate two to three times that of other CEO transitions, early preparation is one of the board’s most important tools.